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Introduction
Effective vertical coordination among value chain actors, 
from raw material producers to distributers, is considered to 
EHDNH\VRXUFHRIFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVIRU¿UPVRSHUDWLQJLQWKH
agriculture sector (Hendrikse, 2007; Reynolds et al., 2009). 
Much of the research focused on exchange relationships (e.g. 
Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2009; Jang 
DQG2OVRQHPSKDVLVHVWKHEHQH¿WVRIYHUWLFDOO\FRRU
dinated business relationships. Improved coordination can 
lead to higher business productivity (Dyer and Singh, 1998), 
reduce the uncertainty in food safety demand (Ménard and 
9DOFHVFKLQLDQGLPSURYHIDUPSUR¿WDELOLW\-DQJDQG
Olson, 2010).
:KLOH WKH EHQH¿WV RI HIIHFWLYH YHUWLFDO FRRUGLQDWLRQ
appear to be clear, building and maintaining such relation
ships poses considerable challenges. In the agriculture sec
tor, coordination requires the development of sustainable 
business relationships (Perez et al., 2010; Fischer, 2013), 
GH¿QHGE\)LVFKHUDQG5H\QROGVDVKLJKTXDOLW\DQG
VWDEOH LQWHU¿UP UHODWLRQVKLSV ,Q DGGLWLRQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
the mechanisms and key driving forces that shape such rela
tionships is of crucial importance. As argued by Williamson 
(1979), the type of variation in governance choices can be 
explained by the characteristics of transactions, thus mainly 
(a) the level of uncertainty, (b) the likelihood of recurrence 
DQGFWKHGHJUHHRIDVVHWVSHFL¿FLW\
In addition to Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) original 
DUJXPHQWV:LOOLDPVRQWKHQHWZRUNLQZKLFKD¿UP
operates (suppliers, customers and competitors) affects 
its environment and behaviour, and thereby the type of 
JRYHUQDQFH 3RZHOO DQG6PLWK'RHUU $V5LQJ DQG
Van de Ven (1992) point out, exchange partners establish 
EHKDYLRXUDO UXOHV IRUSURFHVVHV VXFKDVFRQÀLFW UHVROXWLRQ
monitoring and renegotiation. Relational norms between 
exchange partners can develop with the intent of minimising 
EDUJDLQLQJFRVWVVWHPPLQJIURPDVVHWVSHFL¿FLW\DQGXQFHU
tainty (Dow, 1987). Trust, as the main social component of 
relational exchange (Macneil, 1980), reduces both ex ante 
and ex post opportunism (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). 
,QDGGLWLRQWUXVWLVDNH\IDFWRULQÀXHQFLQJWKHOHYHORIVDWLV
IDFWLRQFRPPLWPHQWDQGORQJWHUPRULHQWDWLRQRIH[FKDQJH
relationships (Geyskens et al., 2006).
Our paper focuses on one of the two dimensions of sus
tainable relationships: its durability (Fischer and Reynolds, 
2010). We focus on repeated interactions and transactions 
RYHUWLPHLQYHVWLJDWLQJIDFWRUVLQÀXHQFLQJVXFKORQJWHUP
(durable) relationships, namely uncertainty, trust and asset 
VSHFL¿FLW\:KLOHPXFK UHVHDUFK KDV EHHQ FDUULHG RXW LQ
developed countries which are characterised by solid mar
ket institutions and regulative and legal infrastructure on 
GHWHUPLQDQWV RI ORQJWHUP YHUWLFDO EXVLQHVV UHODWLRQVKLSV
(e.g. Batt and Wilson, 2000; Fischer, 2013), less evidence 
has been collected from developing or transition countries 
which face higher institutional voids (Bouis and Haddad, 
1990). By testing our model in the Albanian dairy sector 
with data from a structured survey with farmers engaged 
in production of goat and sheep milk, we aim to bridge 
this gap. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, this is 
WKH ¿UVW VWXG\ IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH VXSSOLHU VLGH RI WKH$OED
nian dairy sector to apply a TCT perspective. We integrate 
social context into the TCT perspective by explaining how 
VRFLDOPHFKDQLVPV LQÀXHQFHH[FKDQJH UHODWLRQVKLSV)XU
thermore, the operationalisation of some constructs (e.g. 
DVVHWVSHFL¿FLW\EULQJVQHZLQVLJKWVRQWKHVHFWRUVSHFL¿F
characteristics that determine exchange business relation
ships with a focus on durability. Theoretical contributions 
and implication at a managerial and policy level are further 
discussed.
In the next section of this paper we provide an over
view of the dairy sector, focusing on its importance, major 
trends, actors involved, value chain coordination dynamics 
and other relevant information. The subsequent literature 
review considers the role played by uncertainty, asset speci
¿FLW\DQG WUXVWRQVXVWDLQDEOHUHODWLRQVKLSVXVLQJ WKH7&7
perspective. The later sections cover methodology, analysis 
of the results, discussions of conclusions and policy and 
managerial implications.
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Dairy sector overview
7KHOLYHVWRFNVHFWRULVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDJULIRRGVHF
tor in Albania as it accounts for about half of the output value 
of agriculture. Within the livestock sector, dairy produc
tion is considered a priority sector for Albanian agriculture 
0$5':$DVZHOODVDQLPSRUWDQWVRXUFHRILQFRPH
and food, particularly for remote rural areas.
Milk production has been growing during the last dec
ade: sheep milk production increased by 13 per cent and goat 
PLONE\SHUFHQWGXULQJWKHSHULRGZKLOHWKH
increase in cow milk production for the same period was 
only 3 per cent. According to Albanian Institute of Statis
tics data, small ruminant (goat and sheep) milk production 
makes up around 15 per cent of the total milk production (the 
remaining 85 per cent comes from cows). While cow milk is 
produced throughout the year and is the basis for all types 
of local dairy products, sheep and goat milk is typically sea
sonal and almost exclusively used to produce cheese; the two 
PDLQ DQG WUDGLWLRQDO W\SHV RI FKHHVHV DUHZKLWH IHWDOLNH
and kashkaval (hard yellow) cheese. The domestic market 
LV GRPLQDWHG E\ ORFDOO\SURGXFHG FKHHVH EXW H[SRUWV DUH
ORZRUQRQH[LVWHQWGXHWRKLJKSURGXFWLRQFRVWVDQGODFNRI
compliance with international safety standards.
The milk production, collection and distribution system 
is still very fragmented and characterised by small farms and 
dairies. Albanian Ministry of Agriculture data show that, 
during early 2010s, 85 per cent of farms with sheep had up 
to 50 heads and the situation is similar for goat farms. There 
DUH DERXW PLON SURFHVVLQJ XQLWV LQ$OEDQLD RI ZKLFK
approximately 25 are large processors, processing more 
than 10 tonnes per day, 220 are traditional, seasonal dairy 
processing plants relying only on goat milk; however, the 
number of informal processors might be much higher.
The selected regions (targeted by our survey) account 
for slightly more than 50 per cent of the total small rumi
nant milk production. On the other hand, about half of the 
seasonal dairy processing units are located in these selected 
regions (dairy processors of various sizes). For large dairy 
processing units, it is not possible to delineate the region of 
supply, as they often buy milk from farms located in other 
regions too, while smaller/seasonal processors rely exclu
sively on local raw milk.
([FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLSVLQWKH$OEDQLDQDJULIRRGVHFWRU
are largely based on spot market or informal agreements; 
however, other forms of chain coordination are emerging 
LQVRPHVXEVHFWRUV)RUH[DPSOHDJUHHPHQWVERWKZULWWHQ
and verbal (informal) types, are more common for green
house tomatoes (which have a strong export orientation) than 
IRU IUXLWVDSSOHV RU RWKHU LPSRUWDQW VXEVHFWRUV ,6(71-
2017). In the dairy sector, farmers tend to sell directly to pro
FHVVLQJSODQWVXVXDOO\VPDOOGDLULHVWKRXVDQGOLWUHVSHU
day), while selling to collectors or other intermediaries is a 
very rare practice. However, in some regions, large dairies 
have been building more complex cold chains that include 
milk collection points. Written contracts between cattle dairy 
IDUPHUVDQGSURFHVVHUVDUHOLPLWHGWRRQO\SHUFHQWZKLOH
oral agreements are quite common (two thirds of farmers 
stated that they agree upon them). There are no available 
data regarding written contracts for goat and sheep milk.
$VWKHGRPHVWLFDJULIRRGSURGXFWLRQLVLQFUHDVLQJIRRG
safety is becoming a growing concern, particularly for the 
livestock/dairy value chain (Gjeci et al., 2016). The causes 
for the lack of quality and safety standards vary, but one 
main determinant is the weak coordination in the value chain 
(Dries et al., 2009). Despite the slow consolidation trend, the 
milk production, collection and distribution system is still 
fragmented and characterised by high levels of informality 
(from farm, processers, down to retail) and weak monitoring 
from state authorities, hence resulting in a lack of product 
traceability. Policy makers are aware of the need to improve 
supply chain coordination mechanisms and governance. The 
Albanian Intersectoral Agriculture and Rural Development 
6WUDWHJ\HPSKDVLVHVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFRRUGLQD
WLRQ E\ SURSRVLQJ VSHFL¿F VXSSRUWPHDVXUHV WR VWUHQJWKHQ
YHUWLFDODQGKRUL]RQWDOFRRSHUDWLRQ0$5':$
Rationale and hypothesis develop-
ment
$VVHWVSHFL¿FLW\DQGORQJWHUP
business relationships
$VVHWVSHFL¿FLW\UHIHUVWRGXUDEOHDQGVSHFLDOLVHGLQYHVW
ments in support of particular transactions with limited value 
in an alternative use (Williamson, 1985). The presence of 
VSHFL¿FDVVHWVFDQEHWKRXJKWRIDVFUHDWLQJVZLWFKLQJFRVWV
LELG$VVHWVSHFL¿FLW\LVWKHUHVXOWRIWKLQPDUNHWV'RUZDUG
DQG.\GG OHDGLQJ¿UPV WR DGRSWJRYHUQDQFH VWUXF
tures that mitigate such risks. Dyer (1996) suggests that the 
SUHVHQFH RI VSHFL¿F DVVHWV FDQ OHDG WR HQKDQFHG FRRUGLQD
tion and cooperation between business partners. Empirical 
research in the dairy sector shows that the rise in human, 
SK\VLFDODQGVLWHVSHFL¿FDVVHWVLQFUHDVHVWKHGHJUHHRIYHUWL
FDOFRRUGLQDWLRQ%DQWHUOHet al., 2006). Hence, we posit that:
• +\SRWKHVLV,QYHVWPHQWLQVSHFL¿FDVVHWVLQFUHDVHV
WKHOLNHOLKRRGRIORQJWHUPEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLSV
Uncertainty and long-term business relationships
8QFHUWDLQW\ LV D PXOWLIDFHWHG GLPHQVLRQ RI H[FKDQJH
relationships with a very diverse effect on governance 
choices. As Klein (1989, p.256) noted, “It appears that 
uncertainty is too broad a concept and that different facets 
RILWOHDGWRERWKDGHVLUHIRUÀH[LELOLW\DQGDPRWLYDWLRQWR
reduce transaction costs”. Hence, in analysing governance 
choice, we take into account different facets of uncertainty 
WKDW PLJKW DIIHFW ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ GDLU\
farmers and their buyers.
Milk producers face environmental and behavioural 
uncertainty in transactions with their buyers. Local supply 
and demand mismatch may contribute to price volatility and 
volume uncertainty (the volume requirements especially 
GXULQJWKHSHDNVHDVRQDUHGLI¿FXOWWRIRUHFDVW)DUPHUVIDFH
behavioural uncertainty too, because of the unbalanced nego
tiating power compared to dairy owners, resulting in con
tractual (although only verbal) commitment uncertainties. 
However, these different facets of uncertainty are very often 
Long-term business relationships in the dairy value chain
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seen by farmers as intertwined with each other. Uncertainty 
about volumes and price is often linked with opportunistic 
behaviour of dairy owners (behaviour uncertainty), not to 
the external market factors, although this might be the case. 
Hence, in our study, a comprehensive and separate assess
ment of the role played by different facets of uncertainty in 
determining governance choice was quite challenging. How
ever, we can hypothesise opposite outcomes depending on 
the role played by different facets of uncertainty.
Uncertainty can encourage the adoption of hierarchical 
or hybrid forms of governance as mechanisms to reduce 
transaction cost, since uncertainty can instigate adaptation 
DQG HYDOXDWLRQ SUREOHPV +HLGH  7KLV WHQGHQF\ LV
stronger when business partners are engaged in recurrent 
WUDQVDFWLRQVZKLFKLVW\SLFDOIRUWKHGDLU\VHFWRU:KLOHQRQ
cooperative behaviour can be a proper strategy for discrete 
exchanges, the expectation of reciprocity encourages busi
QHVVSDUWQHUV WR FRRSHUDWH LQRQJRLQJH[FKDQJHV 3DUNKH
1993). As argued by Geyskens et al. (2006) we can expect 
parties to set up vertical coordination or relational types of 
governance in order to mitigate opportunism.
Volume uncertainty can also lead to hierarchical forms of 
JRYHUQDQFH:DONHUDQG:HEHU:KHQVXSSOLHUVSHU
ceive the market as unstable in terms of demand volumes, 
they might experience excess capacity. For milk producers, 
this situation can result in income loss. Since suppliers’ vol
XPHYDULDWLRQ FDQ EHPDQDJHGPRUH HI¿FLHQWO\ZKHQ ERWK
suppliers and buyers coordinate with each other, volume 
uncertainty increases the likelihood for hierarchical govern
ance modes to arise (ibid.). From the buyer’s perspective, 
increasing coordination is a way to reduce both food safety 
risks as suggested by Ménard and Valceschini (2005) and vol
XPHXQFHUWDLQW\:DONHUDQG:HEHU+HQFHZHSRVLW
• +\SRWKHVLVD8QFHUWDLQW\ LQFUHDVHV WKH OLNHOLKRRG
RIORQJWHUPEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLSV
On the contrary, some facets of uncertainty can encour
DJHÀH[LELOLW\OHDGLQJEXVLQHVVSDUWQHUVWRFKRRVHVSRWPDU
ket exchange over hierarchical or hybrid forms of govern
ance. Behaviour uncertainty and environmental uncertainty 
might have this kind of impact on the exchange relationship.
,QFRQWUDVWWRWKHDUJXPHQWVRI+HLGHDQG3DUNKH
(1993), Suh and Kwonb (2006) argue that the presence of 
behaviour uncertainty lowers trust with detrimental effects on 
relational ties and the durability of the exchange relationship. 
Lack of fairness can seriously affect the relationship between 
business partners (Das and Teng, 2001; Ring and Van de Ven, 
DQG¿QDOO\WKHRXWFRPHRIVXFKDUHODWLRQVKLS
On the other hand, high levels of perceived environ
mental uncertainty may negatively affect the willingness of 
exchange partners to invest in durable relationships (Joshi 
DQG&DPSEHOOPRWLYDWLQJWKHPWRUHPDLQÀH[LEOHDQG
develop temporary relationships only (Ganesan and Hess, 
7KLVUHDVRQLQJLVLQOLQHZLWKWKHVHOIHQIRUFLQJUDQJH
RI WKH FRQWUDFWXDO UHODWLRQVKLS GH¿QHGE\.OHLQ  DV
the magnitude of the private sanctions that can be imposed 
RQ HDFK WUDQVDFWRU ZKR DWWHPSWV D KROGXS 7KH DXWKRU
argues that an exchange relationship will continue as long as 
market prices stay within a certain range. On the contrary, if 
SULFHYRODWLOLW\LVKLJKEH\RQGWKHVHOIHQIRUFLQJUDQJHWKH
gains of breaching the contract exceed the sanctions, hence, 
eventually, breaking down the relationship.
Anecdotal evidence from Albania suggests that some dairy 
owners have (mis)used their stronger bargaining position, 
HVSHFLDOO\ GXULQJ SHULRGV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ VXSSO\GHPDQG
mismatch, lowering prices for raw milk. In some cases, 
they have also changed quality requirements and transport 
arrangements, leading to uncertainty among farmers. Farm
ers that are faced with opportunistic behaviour by a buyer 
might tend to search for alternative buyers. Even when prices 
change because of market factors and the change is not attrib
uted to the dairy owner’s opportunistic behaviour, commit
PHQW WR ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV LV HURGHG7KHUHIRUHEDVHG
on this line of reasoning, our alternative hypothesis is that 
uncertainty, both related to market price volatility or buyer’s 
EHKDYLRXUKDVQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVRQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSV
• +\SRWKHVLVE8QFHUWDLQW\ORZHUVWKHOLNHOLKRRGRI
ORQJWHUPEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLSV
Trust and long-term business relationships
In general, trust is an expectation into the future behav
iour of others; it emerges after positive personal experiences 
(Luhmann, 2000). Governance will be enhanced with increas
ing levels of trust (Joshi and Stump, 1999). The expected 
SD\RIIV IURP FRRSHUDWLRQ GHWHU WUXVWZRUWK\ EXVLQHVV SDUW
QHUV IURP WKH SXUVXLW RI VKRUWWHUP JDLQV WKHUHE\ OLPLWLQJ
opportunistic behaviour (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). On the 
other hand, relational exchange is often based on informal 
agreements based on trust and reputation; thus trust serves 
as a substitute for contracts since the latter are too costly to 
write, monitor and enforce (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995). 
Thus, trust reduces both ex ante and ex post transaction costs 
by mitigating or eliminating opportunism (Zaheer and Ven
katraman, 1995). Based on this reasoning, we expect trust 
to affect positively the durability of exchange relationships.
(PSLULFDOUHVHDUFKFRQ¿UPVWKHUROHRIWUXVWLQVKDSLQJ
H[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLSV6XVWDLQDEOHDQGORQJWHUPUHODWLRQ
ships based on trust have been found to be an alternative to 
vertical integration and contracts for the German pork sec
tor (Schulze et al&ODURDQG&ODURDUJXHWKDW
PXWXDOWUXVWMRLQWDFWLRQVDQGORQJWHUPRULHQWDWLRQLQDGGL
tion to formal contracts, are informal safeguard mechanisms 
adopted by partners in international coffee supply chains. 
Based on this evidence, our third research hypothesis is as 
follows:
• +\SRWKHVLV7KHH[LVWHQFHRIWUXVWEHWZHHQEXVLQHVV
SDUWQHUV LQFUHDVHV WKH OLNHOLKRRGRI ORQJWHUPEXVL-
QHVVUHODWLRQVKLSV
Methodology
Data
$VWUXFWXUHGIDUPVXUYH\XVLQJWZRVWDJHVDPSOLQJWRRN
SODFHGXULQJVSULQJ7KH¿UVWVWDJHZDVSXUSRVLYHFRQ
sisting of a piloting process in various regions (with differ
ent characteristics), namely Shkodër, Kukës, Dibër (located 
in northern Albania), Berat, Korçë and Elbasan (located 
Blendi Gërdoçi, Engjell Skreli, Edvin Zhllima and Drini Imami
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in central and eastern Albania). SPPS module of Complex 
Sample was used to select the sample. A sample of 15 vil
lages was selected from all the villages in each region. In 
order to have a statistically solid subsample, 315 farmers 
were interviewed. The margin of error based on small rumi
nants’ value chain subsamples is ±5.6 per cent with a 95 per 
FHQW FRQ¿GHQFH LQWHUYDO ,VUDHO  7KH TXHVWLRQQDLUH
was designed to operationalise the constructs discussed in 
WKHIROORZLQJVXEVHFWLRQ7KHLQIRUPDWLRQZDVFROOHFWHGRQ
relationships between supplier and buyer, volume, price as 
well as level of uncertainty, trust and commitment of farmer 
towards his/her buyer. Information such as demographics 
(age, education, gender, household size and main employ
ment), presence negotiation costs and horizontal cooperation 
was also gathered.
Measurements
The constructs and the operationalisation of variables are 
listed in Table 1 and discussed below.
/RQJWHUPEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLSVFollowing Fischer and 
Reynolds (2010), conceptualisation of sustainable relation
VKLSVDVDFRQVWUXFWFRPSRVHGE\D WZRGLPHQVLRQTXDOLW\
and durability, we focus on the latter so as to capture the 
dynamicity of the relationship. Considering the lack of 
contractual governance and relational nature of the relation
ships, we build on operationalisation of Klein (1996) who 
refers to relational ties as the degree of a supplier’s dedica
tion to its buyer. Hence, we use repeated exchange with one 
or, very rarely, few (no more than two) selected buyers to 
PHDVXUH D ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLS LQ UDUH FDVHVZKHQRQH
dairy is seasonal, farmers that produce cow milk (in addition 
to goat and sheep milk) tend to sell their produce to two dif
ferent dairies depending which one is operating in a particu
lar season). Farmers were asked to state if they sell (usually) 
WRRQHRUYHU\IHZVHOHFWHGEX\HUVLQWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHG
circumstances), or if they are inclined to engage in spot mar
ket type of exchange relationships. The respondents were 
informed that the exchange needed to extend over a period 
of at least one year to be considered as repeated exchange 
with one buyer. This operationalisation is consistent with the 
empirical work of John and Weitz (1988) and Zaheer and 
Venkatraman (1995) who used similar measures. We use a 
binary variable to measure the level of repeated exchange to 
one/few partners.
6SHFL¿FDVVHWV3XUFKDVHRIGDLU\VSHFL¿FHTXLSPHQWDQG
LQYHVWPHQWLQDODUJHÀRFNRIVPDOOUXPLQDQWVLVXQGHUWDNHQ
E\IDUPHUVXVXDOO\ZLWKWKH¿UPLQWHQWWRVSHFLDOLVHLQPLON
production. These investments can be diverted to alternative 
uses only at a substantial cost. We argue that the more farm
ers specialise in milk production as their main agricultural 
DFWLYLW\DQG LQYHVW WR LQFUHDVH WKHLUÀRFNDQGRWKHU UHODWHG
investments (e.g. stables), the more their assets are special
ised to the exchange relationship (e.g. quality requirements, 
milk source and type, storage and transport requirements). 
+HQFHWKHÀRFNVL]HFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDVDQDGHTXDWHPHDV
XUHRILQYHVWPHQWLQVSHFL¿FDVVHWVIRUPLONSURGXFHUV
(PSLULFDOUHVHDUFKFRQ¿UPVWKLVLPSRUWDQWUROHRIÀRFN
VL]HLQGH¿QLQJWKHQDWXUHRIH[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLSV7VRXU
giannis et al. (2008) found that farm and farmers’ charac
WHULVWLFVVXFKDV WKHVL]HRI WKHÀRFNYROXPHRIPLONSUR
duction, farm income and debt affect the market channels 
choice of the small ruminant milk producers. Similar results 
were obtained by Bardhana et al. (2012). Following Dries 
DQG6ZLQQHQZKRPHDVXUHG LQYHVWPHQW LQVSHFL¿F
DVVHWVLQWKHGDLU\VHFWRULQ3RODQGLQFOXGLQJÀRFNVL]HDQG
WKHUDWLRQDOHDERYHZHRSHUDWLRQDOLVHVSHFL¿FDVVHWVDVWKH
number of small ruminant heads and measure it as a loga
rithm of this number in order to linearise the relationship and 
avoid heteroscedasticity.
7UXVW: Consistent with the reasoning of Anderson and 
1DUXV  DQG =DKHHU DQG 9HQNDWUDPDQ  ZH
included two items that measure the mutuality of trust and 
two others that measure behavioural trust. Each item is 
PHDVXUHG RQ D ¿YHSRLQW /LNHUW VFDOH7KH IRXULWHP FRQ
struct yielded a Cronbach Alpha of 0.829.
8QFHUWDLQW\Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) operation
DOLVHGXQFHUWDLQW\WKURXJKWZRLQGLFDWRUVUHÀHFWLQJSHUFHLYHG
Table 1: Constructs and measures.
Construct and concept Operationalisation Measurement
Dependent variable
/RQJWHUPEXVLQHVV
relationship
• Repeated exchange with selected buyer %LQDU\, 1 = sell to reliable buyers, 0 = spot market ex
change type of relationships
Independent variable
6SHFL¿FDVVHWV • Flock size /RJDULWKPRIÀRFNVL]H
Uncertainty • The demand for our products is unstable
• The prices for our products are very unstable
• My buyer/s frequently changes/change the request for products 
qualities and standards
)LYHSRLQW/LNHUW VFDOH  VWURQJO\DJDLQVW VWURQJO\
agree)
Trust • I (as a supplier) can be trusted by my buyers
• I am very committed to the relationship with my main buyers
• The relationship with my buyers deserves maximum attention.
• %X\HUVLVDUHVDWLV¿HGZLWKP\SURGXFWV
)LYHSRLQW/LNHUWVFDOH VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH VWURQJO\
agree)
Controls
Bargaining power of 
buyers
• The farmer operates in a region characterised by the presence of 
large buyers
%LQDU\, 1 = farmer conducts business in a region charac
WHULVHG E\ WKH SUHVHQFH RI ODUJH GDLU\ ¿UPV  IDUPHU
conducts business in a region characterised by presence 
of small dairies
Cow milk production • The farmer is engaged in production and selling of cow milk %LQDU\, 1 = income from cow milk, 0 = no income from 
cow milk
Source: own construction
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uncertainty related to pricing and the new product introduc
tion. However, in our case, farmers’ uncertainty is also closely 
related to the volumes of milk bought by the processor. Based 
on this reasoning, we operationalise the construct using three 
items: uncertainty regarding volume, price and product speci
¿FDWLRQV(DFKLWHPLVPHDVXUHGRQD¿YHSRLQW/LNHUWVFDOH
The Cronbach Alpha for this construct (0.793) is acceptable.
Controls
%DUJDLQLQJ SRZHU RI EX\HUV Fischer (2013) argues 
that equal power distribution leads to sustainable relation
ships. Hence, strong bargaining power from buyers might 
QHJDWLYHO\ DIIHFW WKH ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLS +RZHYHU WKH
presence of large dairies and their strong purchasing power 
might mitigate the farmers’ perception of volume uncer
WDLQW\LQFHQWLYLVLQJIDUPHUVWRHQJDJHLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQ
ships. Consequently, we do not hypothesise a direction for 
this variable in our model, but rather include it as a control 
variable.
&RZPLONSURGXFWLRQ: Our research is focused on farmers 
engaged in small ruminant (goat and sheep) milk produc
tion. However, many farmers produce cow milk too. Using 
WKHVDPHUDWLRQDOHIRUDVVHWVSHFL¿FLW\ZHPLJKWH[SHFWWKDW
production of cow milk might motivate farmers to build 
ORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSV
Empirical model
A binary logistic regression model is used to assess the 
GHWHUPLQDQWVRIIDUPHUV¶ OLNHOLKRRGWRHQJDJHLQ ORQJWHUP
relationships. This model was selected considering the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. This model 
has the following form:
 (1)
where P
i
 , the probability that the supplier i is engaged in 
ORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSV– P
i
 , the probability that the sup
plier i engages in spot market exchange; a, a constant; x
i
 , 
z
i
 , WKH YDULDEOHV VWDQGLQJ IRU GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOHV VSHFL¿F
assets, trust and uncertainty; and E
i
 , c
i
 , vectors of parameters 
to be estimated.
 (2)
The odds ratio for the case at hand should be interpreted 
as follows: one unit increase – says – in the level of uncer
tainty increases by  the ratio of probability that supplier 
HQJDJHVLQORQJWHUPH[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLSVWRWKHSUREDELO
ity that farmer does engage in spot market exchange.
Construct validity for the two 
perceptual independent variables
We performed a factor analysis with varimax rotation 
to test the validity of our perceptual independent variables 
(Annex). The results for trust design variable loaded reason
DEO\KLJK )RUXQFHUWDLQW\DOO
WKUHHIDFWRUVDOVR ORDGHGKLJK/RDG
ings were above the acceptable standard of 0.32 proposed 
by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). After the validity tests, we 
concluded that the measures could be accepted to test the 
hypotheses.
Variables correlations and multicollinearity
7KH FRUUHODWLRQ FRHI¿FLHQWV EHWZHHQ WKH LQGHSHQGHQW
YDULDEOHV DUHQRW VLJQL¿FDQW GDWDQRW VKRZQ ,Q DGGLWLRQ
9DULDQFH ,QÀDWLRQ)DFWRUV 9,) DUH DURXQG7KXV WKHUH
are no problems with multicollinearity.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The average size of the small ruminants’ herd is small, 
around 87 animals (Table 2). There is a strong variability 
LQ ÀRFN VL]H 6'  %RWK XQFHUWDLQW\ DQG WUXVW KDYH
PHDQVDERYHDYHUDJHPHDVXUHPHQWVXVHG/LNHUWVFDOH
7KLVPLJKWDSSHDUFRXQWHULQWXLWLYHEXWLWFDQLQGLFDWHWKDW
farmers trust their buyers at a personal level (behaviour trust) 
but are uncertain about price and quality requirements due to 
environment factors that affect both parties. Hence, we can 
DVVXPH WKDW HQYLURQPHQWDO XQFHUWDLQW\ SOD\V D VLJQL¿FDQW
role in the overall level of uncertainty perceived by farmers.
Of the 315 farmers, 173 (56 per cent) engage in spot 
PDUNHWH[FKDQJHDQGSHUFHQWKDYHORQJWHUPUHOD
tionships with dairy owners and managers (Table 3). These 
data suggest a strong reluctance among farmers to coordinate 
with their buyers, showcasing the lack of coordination and 
resulting challenges in the dairy and livestock sector. These 
results appear to be consistent across the regions included 
in the survey. The only outlier is the region of Berat. This is 
one of the regions renowned for the presence of large proces
VRUVLQDOPRVWDOODJULIRRGVHFWRUVLQFOXGLQJWKHGDLU\VHF
tor. Erzeni, a large milk processing company, for instance, 
KDVHVWDEOLVKHG ORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKGDLU\ IDUPHUV
LQFOXGLQJZULWWHQFRQWUDFWV,6(71-$QHFGRWDOHYL
dence suggests that large milk processors tend to invest more 
in supply chain coordination than smaller ones.
Table 2: 'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFV1 .
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Flock size 30 200 86.7 53.5
Uncertainty 1.00 5.00 3.59 
Trust 1.00 5.00  0.59
Source: own data
Table 3: 1XPEHUVRIIDUPHUVLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVYHUVXVVSRW
market exchange by region.
Region Sport market exchange Long-term relationship
Shkodër  32  27
Kukës  35  13
Dibër  31  15
Elbasan  32  17
Berat  11  36
Korçë  35  31
Total 176 139
Source: own data
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Regression model results: hypotheses tested
7DEOHGHSLFWVWKHUHVXOWVUHODWHGWRK\SRWKHVHVDQG
 7KHUH LV D VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQL¿FDQW SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQYDULDEOHVUHSUHVHQWLQJ WUXVWDQGÀRFNVL]HDQG WKH
YDULDEOH UHSUHVHQWLQJ ORQJWHUP EXVLQHVV UHODWLRQVKLS DQG
D QHJDWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ XQFHUWDLQW\ DQG ORQJWHUP
business relationship.
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test, assessing the good
QHVV RI ¿W RI DPRGHO VKRZV S!  FRQ¿UPLQJ
WKHYDOLGLW\RIRXUPRGHO7KHFODVVL¿FDWLRQWDEOHVKRZVWKDW
69.5 per cent of the outcome was predicted by our model 
FRPSDUHGWRSHUFHQWRIWKHLQLWLDOPRGHO7KH1DJHO
kerke R Square shows that around 22 per cent of the variance 
FDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVRQO\SHU
cent can be attributed to controls). The following interpreta
WLRQLVEDVHGRQWKH¿QDOUHVXOWVRIRXUDQDO\VLV
,QYHVWPHQWLQVSHFL¿FDVVHWVDQG
long-term business relationship
$VH[SHFWHGWKHODUJHUWKHÀRFNVL]HLQYHVWPHQWLQVSH
FL¿FDVVHWV WKHPRUH OLNHO\ IDUPHUVDUH WRHVWDEOLVK ORQJ
term business relationships with their buyers (p < 0.01 and 
exp (B  DV VKRZQ LQ7DEOH  LHHypothesis 1 is 
VXSSRUWHG0RUH DFFXUDWHO\ IRU RQH XQLW FKDQJH LQ ÀRFN
size (or for an increase of 2.7 heads increase; we used the 
natural logarithm to the base of mathematical constant) the 
odds ratio of engaging in sustainable relationships almost 
doubles (exp (B) = 1.956).
)ORFN VL]H DSSHDUV WR EH VWURQJO\ UHODWHG WR ORQJWHUP
business relationship (Pearson’s Chi square test shows a 
S$URXQG  SHU FHQW RI WKH IDUPHUV WKDW HQJDJH
LQ ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV RZQ PRUH WKDQ  DQLPDOV
versus just 23 per cent of farmers engaged in spot market 
exchange (Table 5). These results suggest that farmers who 
KDYH LQYHVWHG UHODWLYHO\ ODUJH ¿QDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV RZQLQJ
VL]DEOHÀRFNV WHQG WRPLWLJDWHXQFHUWDLQW\DQG WKH ULVNE\
EXLOGLQJ ORQJWHUPEXVLQHVV UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKHLUEX\HUV
Specialisation in milk production appears to make farmers 
more inclined to deal regularly with one buyer, since their 
investment has limited value in an alternative use compared 
to smaller farmers who can switch to other activities (e.g. 
homemade cheese).
Uncertainty and long-term business relationship
As hypothesised, the presence of uncertainty is nega
WLYHO\DQGVLJQL¿FDQWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKORQJWHUPUHODWLRQ
ships (i.e. +\SRWKHVLVELVDOVRVXSSRUWHG. The parameter 
exp (B LV  VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQL¿FDQW DW S 7DEOH
VKRZLQJWKDWIDUPHUVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRFKDQJHEX\HUV
and engage in spot market type of exchange if uncertainty 
increases.
Descriptive statistics show that farmers who perceive 
higher levels of uncertainty tend to engage in spot market 
H[FKDQJH&KLVTXDUHDQDO\VLVVKRZVDVLJQL¿FDQWDVVRFLD
WLRQEHWZHHQXQFHUWDLQW\DQGORQJWHUPEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLS
(p < 0.05). Of the 176 farmers who engage in spot market 
exchange, 133 (i.e. around 76.0 per cent) perceive levels of 
uncertainty above the average, versus only 80 (57.5 per cent) 
RXWRIWKHIDUPHUVWKDWHQJDJHLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSV
with their buyers. However, despite the expected differences, 
the level of uncertainty, as explained earlier, is quite high due 
to market factors.
Trust and sustainable relationships
7UXVW LV SRVLWLYHO\ DQG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK
sustainable relationships (i.e. +\SRWKHVLV  LV VXSSRUWHG
DVZHOO. The parameter exp (B) for 7UXVW LVDQGLW LV
VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQL¿FDQW DW S 7DEOH  VKRZLQJ WKDW
farmers that trust their buyers are more inclined to engage in 
ORQJWHUPEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLSV'HVFULSWLYHDQDO\VLVVKRZV
FOHDUO\WKDWIDUPHUVHQJDJHGLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVKDYH
higher levels of trust in their buyers compared to those that 
HQJDJHLQVSRWPDUNHWH[FKDQJH$URXQGSHUFHQWRIIDUP
HUVHQJDJHGLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVFODLPWRSHUFHLYHKLJK
levels of trust compared to just 29 per cent of farmers that 
engage in spot market relationships (Table 6). Chi square 
DQDO\VLV SURYLGHV IXUWKHU FRQ¿UPDWLRQ RI WKH VLJQL¿FDQW
DVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQWUXVWDQGORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSV±WKH
SYDOXHLVVPDOOHUWKDQ
)LQDOO\ RXU UHVXOWV IRU WKH FRQWURO YDULDEOHV 7DEOH 
show that our proxy for bargaining power of buyers is posi
WLYHO\ DQG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ UHODWHG WR ORQJWHUP EXVLQHVV UHOD
tionships (exp (B) = 2.521 and (p < 0.001), while the variable 
standing for a mixed farm (versus a small ruminants farm) 
producing both sheep and goat milk and cow milk does not 
DIIHFW ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ IDUPHUV DQG WKHLU
EX\HUVS!
Table 5: 1XPEHUVRIIDUPHUVLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVYHUVXV
VSRWPDUNHWH[FKDQJHE\ÀRFNVL]H
Flock size Sport market exchange Long-term relationship
  83  
  52  
  27  31
    25
Total 176 139
Source: own data
Table 6: 1XPEHUVRIIDUPHUVLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVYHUVXVVSRW
market exchange by level of trust.
Level of trust Sport market exchange Long-term relationship
Low   2   1
Average 123  73
High    65
Total 176 139
Source: own data
Table 4: Results of the logistic regression.
Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. exp (B)
Bargaining power of 
buyers
 0.925 0.262  0.000** 2.521
Cow milk production  0.197 0.261  0.571  1.218
Flock size  0.671   0.001** 1.956
Uncertainty  0.051  5.591 0.018* 0.886
Trust  0.250 0.058 18.878 0.000** 
Constant   19.676 0.000** 0.001
'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOHORQJWHUPEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLSSS
Source: own data
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Discussion
2XU VWXG\ DQDO\VHG WKH IDFWRUV WKDW LQÀXHQFH WKH SUR
pensity of goat and sheep dairy farmers in Albania to build 
ORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKHLUEX\HUVXVLQJWKH7&7SHU
VSHFWLYH7KLVLVWKH¿UVWLQGHSWKVWXG\IRFXVLQJRQWKHGDLU\
sector exchange relationships in Albania, a research setting 
FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ VLJQL¿FDQW LQVWLWXWLRQDO YRLGV DQG ODFN RI
contracts.
7KHUHVHDUFKIRXQGWKDWIDUPHUV¶SURSHQVLW\WREXLOGORQJ
term and sustainable relationships with their buyers is deter
PLQHGE\PXWXDOWUXVWXQFHUWDLQW\DQGLQYHVWPHQWLQVSHFL¿F
assets. The positive role of trust in shaping the exchange 
relationship gives credit to sociologists and network theorists 
DUJXLQJWKDWUHODWLRQDOWLHVEDVHGRQWUXVWZLOO\LHOGORQJWHUP
relationships (e.g. Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Dyer and 
6LQJ  &ODUR DQG &ODUR  6FKXO]H et al., 2006). 
+RZHYHUORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGWKHUHFXUUHQFHRIWUDQV
actions can be viewed as the right conditions for trust between 
business partners to grow. Repeated exchange can allow for 
informal control through embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992) 
leading to higher levels of trust as suggested by Heide and 
John (1990). Hence, to understand better the causality of this 
relationship longitudinal, studies are needed.
Our research found that uncertainty is a strong predictor 
RI H[FKDQJH UHODWLRQVKLSV DQG LW KDV D VLJQL¿FDQW QHJDWLYH
HIIHFWRQIDUPHUV¶SURSHQVLW\WRHQJDJHLQORQJWHUPUHODWLRQ
ships. We argue that perceived behaviour uncertainty may 
have a detrimental effect on exchange relationships (see Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1992; Suh and Kwonb, 2006), leading farm
ers to opt for a spot market exchange. Furthermore, in par
ticular periods of time and some local contexts, uncertainty 
might not be related to buyers’ behaviour but rather to market 
dynamics. Price volatility can affect the exchange relation
ship as suggested by some scholars (e.g. Klein, 1996; Joshi 
and Campbell, 2003) leading farmers to break down the rela
tionship. Unfortunately, in our study we are not able to sepa
rate the different effects of environment from behavioural 
uncertainty. Further research might address this shortfall.
,QYHVWPHQWLQVSHFL¿FDVVHWVLVIRXQGWRDIIHFWSRVLWLYHO\
ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV LQ OLQHZLWK7&( DUJXPHQWV :LO
liamson, 1983) and empirical research (e.g. Anderson and 
Weitz, 1992; Dyer, 1996; Banterle et al., 2006). Flock size 
DSSHDUV WREH DQ DGHTXDWHPHDVXUH IRU VSHFL¿F DVVHWV VHH
Dries and Swinnen, 2010), constituting also an important 
factor that determines farmers’ willingness to engage in 
ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV /RQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV DSSHDU WR
represent an ‘insurance policy’ that provide protection from 
the risk of not being able to sell high volumes of milk to dair
ies. On the contrary, smaller farmers whose small quantity 
FDQEHSURFHVVHGRQWKHIDUPDQGXVHGIRUVHOIFRQVXPSWLRQ
have the ‘luxury’ to engage in spot market exchange.
Finally, our study appears to corroborate the role of buyer’s 
bargaining power on exchange relationship. The result shows 
that farmers operating in areas characterised by the presence 
RI ODUJH EX\HUV WHQG WR HQJDJH LQ ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV
We can take some licence to speculate on the reasons behind 
VXFK FRQWURYHUVLDO ¿QGLQJV EDVHG RQ DQHFGRWDO HYLGHQFH
Large buyers tend to pay on time and in full. Furthermore, 
WKH\DSSHDUWRDSSO\¿[HGSULFHVDWOHDVWOHVVYRODWLOHWKDQ
smaller ones). Finally, having a strong purchasing power and 
large market share appears to serve as a guarantee for farmers. 
However, buyers’ characteristics, behaviour and their role in 
exchange relationships should be further investigated.
Our results can help dairy owners/managers to build 
GXUDEOHORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKIDUPHUVDQGXOWLPDWHO\
improve the outcome of their exchange relationships. They 
should consider improving communication and increasing 
information exchange with farmers in order to reduce uncer
tainty and build trust for both partners. On the buyers’ side, 
especially large dairies, improved coordination and durability 
of the exchange relationship can mitigate volume uncertainty 
during the low season. Milk can be found relatively easily 
GXULQJWKHSHDNRISURGXFWLRQEXWLWLVUDWKHUGLI¿FXOWWRµVFRXW¶
for new suppliers, hence increasing volumes, during the low 
season. Anecdotal evidence from the region of Berat and the 
results of our research indicate that large dairies in these areas 
WHQGWREXLOGORQJWHUPUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKHLUVXSSO\EDVH
As a result, they can manage volume uncertainties better. On 
the farmers’ side, the role of the buyer in mitigating uncertain
ties, related to both behaviour and environment, can have ben
H¿FLDOHIIHFWVRQWKHGXUDELOLW\RIWKHUHODWLRQVKLS2XUUHVXOWV
show that when farmers perceive low levels of uncertainty 
and high levels of trust, they tend to engage with one buyer 
only in durable relationships. Hence, price and quality speci
¿FDWLRQVVKRXOGQRWEHYHU\VXVFHSWLEOHWRHYHQWXDOWHPSRUDU\
supply and demand changes, such as seasonal production 
surpluses. Anecdotal evidence suggests that changes in the 
quality standards and price are not a rare phenomenon. Such 
practices adopted by dairy owners may lead to a farmer’s lack 
RIFRPPLWPHQWWRVXVWDLQDORQJWHUPH[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLS
Buyers should make clear their terms and communicate with 
farmers on eventual changes in the market prices.
$WWKHSROLF\OHYHOWKHLPSDFWRIÀRFNVL]HRQIDUPHUV¶
LQFOLQDWLRQ WR HQJDJH LQ ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQVKLSV PD\ KHOS
the government to improve its policy instruments aiming 
WRVXSSRUW IDUPHUVRZQLQJ ODUJHÀRFNV7KHFXUUHQWSROLF\
of paying a price premium per litre delivered to dairies and 
milk collection points based on recorded transactions1 may 
also be used for incentivising commercial (larger) farmers to 
establish closer relationships with buyers. A support scheme 
based on payments per head of small ruminants (minimum 
100 to maximum 300 heads per farm) has been one of the 
main components in the government budgetary support 
(Volk, 2017). Conditioning this direct producer support 
scheme to the application of formal transactions between 
farmers and dairy owners might result in better chain coordi
nation, formalisation of the sector and improved food safety.
This study has some limitations that caution against gen
HUDOLVLQJ WKH¿QGLQJV )LUVWO\ LW IRFXVHV RQO\ RQ WKH VPDOO
UXPLQDQW GDLU\ YDOXH FKDLQ DQG WKH ¿QGLQJV PD\ QRW EH
entirely relevant to the rest of the dairy sector (relying on 
the cow milk). Secondly, our model explains a relatively 
small part of the variability of exchange relationships, 
focusing on only three, albeit important, variables. Future 
research should consider other explanatory variables related 
to exchange relationships in the dairy sector such as physical 
SUR[LPLW\LHVLWHVSHFL¿FLW\-RVNRZRIDOWHUQDWLYH
1 'HFLVLRQRIWKH&RXQFLORI0LQLVWHU¶V1RGDWHG)HEUXDU\³2QGHWHU
mining basic criteria, sectors to be supported and measures of support, for year 2016”.
Blendi Gërdoçi, Engjell Skreli, Edvin Zhllima and Drini Imami
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Annex: Factor analysis for perceptual measures with varimax rotation.
Items of three constructs
Factor*
F1 F2
I (as a supplier) can be trusted by my buyers  0.893 
I am very committed to the relationship with my main buyers  0.772 
The relationship with my buyers deserves maximum attention   0.019
%X\HUVLVDUHVDWLV¿HGZLWKP\SURGXFWV  0.837  0.063
The demand for our products is unstable  0.050  0.796
The prices for our products are very unstable  
My buyer/s frequently changes/change the request for products qualities and standards  
Percentage variance explained 39.5 30.2
*Underlying dimensions as two factors: F1 = trust, F2 = uncertainty
Source: own data
